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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PEGGY BEZNER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
CONTINENTAL DRY CLEANERS, 
INC., a Corporation, and 
BERT HARRY, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellants, Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., and Bert 
Harry, appeal from a judgment in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Judge, upon jury 
trial, submitted on special interrogatories, awarding judgment 
to the respondent on a claim of respondent's that a contract 
entered into between the parties was induced by fraud of appellants, 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On October 1, 1973, respondent filed her complaint in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County seeking various forms of 
relief against the appellants arising from a contract and 
lease between appellants and respondent involving the 
acquisition by the respondent of the In-and-Out Dry Cleaners 
(T. 161). Preliminary proceedings and discovery were duly 
had, an amended complaint was filed on November 12, 1973. 
An answer and counterclaim were filed by the appellants (T. 129). 
The matter was tried upon jury trial beginning March 12, 1975, 
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and was submitted to the jury on special verdict on the 17th 
day of March, 1975. Judgment on the special verdict was duly 
entered on the 29th day of April, 1975, and subsequent post-trial 
motions were filed and disposed of by the trial court. Appeal from 
the judgment was timely filed for review by this Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants respectfully request this Court to reverse and 
order a new trial, or in the alternative to reverse with instructions 
to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for relief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent, Peggy Bezner, had operated a dry cleaning 
establishment in Granger, Utah from 1962 to 1965 (T. 85). She 
had operated an establishment known as the Peggy B for approxi-
mately four years (T. 127). She was interested in purchasing 
a dry cleaning establishment in Salt Lake City (T. 7). She came 
to Utah from Omaha, Nebraska, and examined an establishment 
known as In-and-Out Cleaners (T. 7, 87). She was interested 
in purchasing the business with Richard B. Steadman (T. 7) and 
was shown the establishment by Ludwig Zorn of Alliance Equipment 
Company (T. 208,209). According to the testimony of respondent 
Peggy Bezner, she met with the appellant Gordon E. Harry, the 
owner of Continental Dry Cleaners and In-and-Out Cleaners in the 
latter part of August, 1972 (T. 87, 9). There were approximately two 
conversations among Mr. Steadman, the appellant, and respondent 
and Mr. Zorn. According to Mr. Steadman, he and the respondent 
met with Mr. Harry around August 24th at the Continental 
Cleaners plant. Mr. Harry stated he wanted $40,000 for In-and-Out 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Cleaners because the operation consisted of $31,000 of equipment, 
inventory and goodwill and that the business "was at the time 
grossing in the vicinity of a thousand dollars a week.11 (T. 15) 
The respondent Peggy Bezner also testified that at the first 
meeting she met with Mr. Zorn, Mr. Steadman and Mr. Harry and 
flit was said that the shop was doing about a thousand dollars 
a week.11 (T. 88). 
According to the appellant, Gordon E. Harry, nothing was said 
the time of the second meeting about the volume of business. 
According to Mr. Harry, at the first meeting he stated that the 
operation was designed to do a thousand dollars a week. At that 
meeting Mr. Harry stated that the weeks had been as small as $250 
to as much as $600 a week and that there was Army work being done 
by In-and-Out Cleaners that was comingled with Continental Dry 
Cleaners' operations (R. 162). Mr. Zorn testified that at the 
first conversation in August, at Continental Dry Cleaners, the 
volume was stated to be $500 to $600 per week but that it could do 
as high as $1,000 a week if it had proper management. (TG 209, 
210). Both the respondent, Mrs. Bezner,and Mr. Steadman testified 
that Mr. Harry had indicated that he was having management trouble 
(T. 23, 89). 
Mr. Steadman testified that a second meeting was held on 
Saturday, August 26th, at the Continental plant at which time 
he and the appellant suggested a counter offer which was rejected. 
The counter offer was for $35,000 and the appellant, Mr. Harry, 
said that he would have to have $40,000 based upon the equipment 
and the volume of about a thousand dollars per week (T. 18). 
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The possibility of a partnership was also discussed but rejected 
by respondent (T. 18). Mrs. Bezner acknowledged that no records 
were presented to her because Harry stated he was having management 
problems (R. 91). Respondent acknowledged that she was advised 
by appellant Harry that the In-and-Out Cleaners was being exploited 
by the manager (R. 131). The respondent decided to buy In-and-Out 
Cleaners contending that she relied upon the thousand dollar a 
week assertion as to the volume of business being done by the 
cleaning establishment (T. 93). A purchase agreement and lease 
were eventually signed and the respondent took over the business 
on October 2nd. According to Lillian Harry, wife of the appellant, 
Mrs. Bezner was present many times at the In-and-Out Cleaners 
before taking possession, inspected the cleaners, and inspected 
the receipt book for the company (T. 196-198). Mrs. Harry had 
offered to work for Mrs. Bezner and, in fact, did work approxi-
mately a week for her (T. 201). Mrs. Bezner acknowledged that she 
took possession in October of 1972 and that everything seemed 
all right and that she was satisfied with the equipment. (T. 136). 
Mr. Harry testified that he advised the respondent that all the 
records were on the premises of the In-and-Out Cleaners and res-
pondent acknowledged that she found a box of business records 
on the premises (T. 116-118). Mr. Steadman shortly after the 
agreement terminated his association with Mrs. Bezner (T. 31) 
and Mrs. Bezner occupied the premises conducting the business 
under the terms of the written sales contract and lease including 
the making of monthly payments until July, 1973. No written 
guarantees were ever given as to what the business was grossing 
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and respondent made no effort to contact Mr. Harry when her gross sales 
did not approximate the figure she testified they were supposed 
to approximate (T. 99, 140). She operated the business until 
October 1, 1973, although she terminated the rents in July (T. 133). 
A Notice to Quit premises was served by the appellant on Mrs. Bezner 
on September 21, 1973 (T. 143). Mrs. Bezner testified that the 
business did approximately $400-$500 a week and was falling off. 
(T. 105). 
Mrs. Harry testified that during the time she was operating 
the shop before the respondent assumed possession, that the weekly 
take would vary and that there were $100 to $500 days (T. 203). 
Katherine Winters, an employee of In-and-Out Cleaners, could not 
recall a $500 day (T. 217). Mr. Perry Kiter, who assumed the 
operation of the Cleaners after the respondent left, indicated 
the operation did $1,100 a week on the grand opening and there 
were 18 weeks over $900 unaffected by any raise in prices (T. 73-80). 
The trial court submitted the case to the jury on special 
verdict. (R. 40 and 41). Proposition No. 2 submitted to the 
jury was as follows: 
That the plaintiff Peggy Bezner, after 
having learned that the cleaning business 
had not been grossing approximately $1000 
per week, continued to operate the business 
as her own and failed to notify the defendants 
with reasonable promptness her decision to 
disaffirm and rescind the contracts of sale 
of the business and the lease. 
At the time of trial counsel for the appellant submitted a 
requested instruction on the doctrine of waiver. (R. 82, 89). 
Exception was taken to failure to give an instruction on waiver 
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as set forth in the request (R. 89, T. 242). The jury duly 
answered the special verdict and a judgment on the verdict was 
entered in favor of respondent for $10,670 for rescission of the 
contract including the approximately $10,000 paid down by the 
respondent (T. 149, R. 29,30). 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT1S SUBMISSION OF PROPOSITION NO. 2 TO THE 
JURY WITHOUT GUIDING INSTRUCTIONS AS TO THE LAW GOVERNING 
THE PROPOSITION TO BE ANSWERED WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
The trial court submitted a proposition to the jury embodying 
the question as to whether the appellant Mrs. Bezner failed to 
notify the defendants with reasonable promptness to disaffirm 
and rescind her contract. The jury was thus left with answering 
the question as to whether the respondent had acted reasonably 
after being aware of the alleged fraud that induced the contract 
and whether she acted reasonably to disaffirm the contract. 
However, nowhere in the court's instructions on the law, which 
were given to the jury as guidelines as to how to answer the 
special verdict questions, was there any instruction on what would 
constitute a waiver or ratification as a matter of law or any 
guidelines as to what the law would recognize as a valid waiver. 
The jury was thus left in a situation of having to answer a 
question without their having been given any instruction 
from the court as to the applicable legal standards to be employed 
in answering the question. The jury could only have answered the 
special verdict without reference to the applicable law and on a 
visceral and uninformed basis. 
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Counsel for the appellant expressly requested the trial court 
to give two instructions relative to the second proposition upon 
which the jury was to pass. Exception was duly taken to the 
failure of the court to give one instruction on the issue. 
Consequently, there was compliance with Rule 51 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Therefore, if the issue was properly raised9 
the failure of the court to instruct on the matter would obviously 
be reversible error. Lewis v. White, 2 Utah 2d 101, 269 P.2d 865 
(1954). In Lewis v. White, supra, this court held the failure 
to give a requested instruction in a fraud action constituted 
error. The court noted: 
"It was their duty to make such investi-
gation and inquiry as reasonable care under 
the circumstances would dictate; whether 
this required them to make further inquiry 
concerning the income, and if so, the extent 
thereof was for the jury to determine. 
In their request No. 4, the plaintiffs 
asked the court to instruct the jury concerning 
this element. They also duly excepted to 
the court's refusal, fto instruct the jury 
that it must find that the defendants must 
reasonably have relied upon the misrepresen-
tations of the plaintiff, if any.1 The matter 
was thus adequately called to the court's 
attention." 
This court held the failure to give a proper instruction on 
theory of the case was prejudicial error. 
In 37 Am.Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 386, it is stated: 
Fraud or misrepresentation may be waived. 
It is a general rule that there can be no 
rescission of a transaction or contract for 
fraud where the fraud has been waived by the 
party who has been wronged. Likewise, the 
principle is well settled that a person 
defrauded in a transaction may, by conduct 
inconsistent with an intention to sue for 
damages for the fraud, waive the right to 
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sue. Waiver in this sense is employed 
loosely by some of the authorities, including 
not only a consentual waiver, but a relin-
quishment of rights and powers akin to 
estoppel. If, with full knowledge of the 
fraud and his rights, a defrauded party 
intentionally waives or condones it, he 
cannot thereafter claim damages for the 
fraud. 
A similar standard is observed in 37 C.J.S. Fraud, § 69, where 
it is observed: 
Thus, while the defrauded party may 
retain what he has received, stand to its 
bargain, and recover for the loss caused 
him by the fraud, he cannot maintain an 
action for the original wrong practiced 
on him where, with full knowledge of all 
the material facts, he does an act which 
indicates his intention to stand to the 
contract and waive all right of action for 
the fraud. 
The defense of waiver ratification or estoppel to a fraud action 
is clearly recognized by cases and other authority. Engle v. 
Farrell, 75 Cal. App. 2d 612, 171 P.2d 588 (1946). In 
Beauchamp v. Wilson, 21 Ariz. App. 14, 515 Pac. 41 (1973), the 
Arizona court observed: 
As noted above, Mr. Beauchamp certainly 
knew in April 1968 that the truck had been 
manufactured in 1966. Assuming arguendo that 
such fact would constitute a basis for res-
cission, the jury may well have concluded 
that appellants had waived their right to 
rescind. A purchaser may waive or lose the 
right to rescind a contract for fraud, breach 
of warranty, or failure of the article 
purchased to conform to the contract if he 
uses it as his own property, for his own 
benefit or convenience, after he has 
knowledge of the grounds for rescission. 
See also, Restatement of Restitution, §§ 64 and 68; Koch v. Sky 
Tech, Inc., 263 Ore. 425, 502 P.2d 1367 (1972). It has been 
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repeatedly said by the courts that the question of waiver, estoppel 
or ratification is a question of fact to be decided by the trier 
of fact. Vinneau v. Golde, 50 Wash. 2d 39, 309 P.2d 376 (1957); 
Slide Mines, Inc. v. Denver Equipment Co., 112 Colo. 285, 148 P.2d 
1009 (1944); 37 C.J.S. Fraud, § 131. 
The only question raised by this point on appeal is whether 
the jury was entitled to be given some guiding instructions on the 
issue of waiver. The facts in the instant case showed that res-
pondent retained possession of the premises for approximately a year 
after entering into the agreement and taking control of the 
premises; that she saw the records as to how the business had 
been doing before her stewardship and she became experienced in 
the operation of the business and knew how much profit it was making. 
At no time did she contact the appellant concerning the alleged 
representation that the business would make a gross profit in excess 
of what she was experiencing. A substantial amount of evidence 
points to a reasonable inference that respondent intended to accept 
the contract and the bargain and that when she felt she could no 
longer make it, she then resorted to a claim that she was defrauded. 
She made payments under the contract and lease for a period of 
several months after accepting possession until July 1972. Cf. 
Koch v. Sky Tech., Inc., supra. The evidence justified the 
submission to the jury of the question formulated in Proposition No. 
2, but, more importantly, it justified the submission of a proper 
legal instruction to the jury as to what conduct could constitute 
a waiver on the part of respondent. The trial court's rejection of 
any instruction that gave the jury guidelines as to the appropriate 
standard of law to be applied and at the same time submitting a 
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proposition to the jury could only have left the jury open to follow 
its own whim and caprice and to deny the appellants a properly 
informed jury on an important proposition to appellant's defense. 
It cannot be said that the failure to adequately instruct the jury 
under the circumstances was harmless error. The jury simply did not 
have the law on a vital issue upon which it was asked to make a 
decision. This court should reverse and grant a new trial with 
instructions to the trial court to properly inform the jury on the 
legal standard of waiver. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO 
ESTABLISH FRAUD BY THE APPELLANTS JUSTIFYING AWARDING 
RESCISSION TO RESPONDENT. 
It is respectfully submitted that there was insufficient 
evidence as a matter of law to. establish fraud upon the part 
of the appellants and that as an alternative to granting a 
new trial for the error alleged in Point I of this brief, the 
court should reverse and order respondent's complaint dismissed. 
In Stuck v. Delta Land and Water Co., 63 Utah 495, 227 Pac. 
791 (1924), this court made a definitive pronouncement as to the 
elements of fraud in a civil case. Speaking through Justice 
Thurman, the court observed: 
flIt may be stated generally that the 
elements of actual fraud consist of: 
(1) a representation; (2) it's falsity; 
(3) it's materiality; (4) the spoken 
knowledge of it's falsity or ignorance 
of it's truth; (5) the intent that it 
should be acted upon by the person and 
in the manner reasonably contemplated." 
This court has observed that fraud is never presumed and 
must be proved. Lane v. Peterson, 68 Utah 585, 251 Pac. 374 (1926). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-11-
And, it will not be presumed where there is any other reasonable 
explanation other than that of fraud. Niles v. U.S. Ozocerite, 
38 Utah 367, 113 Pac. 1038 (1911). The burden that the party 
alleging fraud must meet before such a determination can be 
sustained is that of clear and convincing evidence. Universal 
CIT v. Schom, 15 Utah 2d 262, 391 P.2d 293 (1964); Rawson v. Hardy, 
88 Utah 131, 48 P.2d 473 (1935); Chapman v. Troy Laundry, 47 P.2d 
1054 (Utah 1935). As noted from the Stuck case above, in order 
to make out fraud there must be a wilful misrepresentation with 
the intent that it should be acted upon by the person to whom 
it was directed, Hecht v. Metzler, 14 Utah 408, 48 Pac. 37 (1897), 
or a knowing false representation. Fleming v. Fleming Felt Co., 
7 Utah 2d 293, 323 P.2d 712 (1958); Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 
247 P.2d 273 (1952); Oldber v. Sanders, 111 Utah 507, 184 P.2d 229 
(1947). Fraudulent intent must exist when the representation is 
made. Papanikolas v. Sampson, 73 Utah 404, 274 Pac. 856 (1929). 
The requirement of clear and convincing evidence means more than 
merely satisfying the jury of the truth of the allegation urged. 
It means offering evidence that must persuade the jury that the 
truth of the contention is highly probable. McCormick, Evidence, 
2d Ed. § 340. Clear and convincing, this court has said, means: 
"clear, unequivocable, satisfying and convincing.11 Capps v. Capps, 
110 Utah 468, 175 P.2d 470, 473 (1946). It is submitted that the 
evidence in the instant case does not meet the expressed standard. 
According to Mr. Steadman, a party to the contract at one time 
when Mr. Harry made his representation at the first meeting in 
late August, he stated that he wanted $40,000 for In-and-Out 
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Cleaners because there was $31,000 worth of equipment, inventory 
and good will and the business was grossing !!in the vicinity" of 
a thousand dollars a week (T. 15). Mrs. Bezner's testimony was 
that the representation was that the business was doing "about11 
a thousand a week (T. 88). Steadmanfs testimony with reference 
to reliance was that they relied upon the business producing 
"approximately a thousand a week revenue" (T. 29). 
On the other side, Mr. Harry's testimony was that the only 
representation made was at the first meeting and he stated that the 
In-and-Out Cleaners was designed to do a thousand dollars a week and 
that it was doing $250 to as much as $600 and that he thought it was 
doing better. He also indicated that he was sending 2000 pieces 
of Army work per week comingled with Continental Cleaners (T. 162). 
Only one witness testified who was not a party to the trans-
action. That was Ludwig Zorn, who was present at the time when both 
meetings occurred. His testimony corroborated Harry's indicating 
that the representation was that the volume was about $500 to $600 
per week and that it could do $1000 a week if it had proper manage-
ment. Further, no written guarantees or representations were placed 
in the contract. If a party had really had such a representation 
and wanted to protect against approximations, the contract probably 
would have recited the represented volume of business. Further, 
testimony of Perry Kiter,who took over the Cleaners after respondent 
terminated, stated that the Cleaners did $1,100 on the week of the 
grand opening and has had 18 weeks over $900. Mrs. Harry indi-
cated that Mrs. Bezner had inspected the Cleaners and had inspected 
the receipt book (T. 196-198) showing the cash intake from the 
operation of the Cleaners. 
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It is submitted that with the posture of the evidence being 
as outlined that the standard of clear and convincing proof has not 
been met as a matter of law. Admittedly substantial weight must 
be given to the jury's determination; but when it appears that 
the jury's findings must have been based on the application of 
a standard less than that required by law, the jury verdict 
should not stand. It is respectfully submitted that the standard 
of clear and convincing evidence was not met and this court should 
order judgment for the appellants. 
CONCLUSION 
The instant case presents a fairly simple form of error 
on the part of the trial court. The court simply did not 
instruct the jury on a key issue that the jury was required 
to decide and which was presented to them in the form of a 
special verdict. The absence of instruction on a critical 
issue left the jury uninformed on the law. A new trial is 
therefore essential as prejudicial error clearly resulted in 
a prior procedure. Further, it is submitted that the evidence 
when viewed in light of the applicable standard and burden 
of proof which respondent was required to bear simply was 
insufficient to prove fraud on the part of the appellants. 
It is respectfully submitted that this court in so viewing 
the evidence should order judgment for the appellant. 
Respectfully submitted 
JOHN B. ANDERSON 
610 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellants Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. R uben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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